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Aguirre Ochoa, Jerjes; Herrera Torres, Hugo Amador --- "Local Elections and Organised Crime: The Case of Michoacan, Mexico" [2019] IntJlCrimJustSocDem 39; (2019) 8(4) International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy 62
- Introduction
- One of the principal characteristics of organised crime groups worldwide is their relation to political power. In Mexico, as elsewhere,
delinquent groups challenge the functioning of political institutions and battle to impose control over territories. In the Mexican
context, organised crime has too easily exploited the weakness of political institutions to penetrate government. Explaining this
phenomenon requires adopting distinct perspectives that will uncover the political-sociological aspects involved.
-
- The phenomenon of criminality in Mexico must be examined from a perspective that emphasises the relationship between political elites
and criminal groups. One difference between the Mexican case and other regions around the world is that in numerous municipalities
in Mexico, these relations have congealed around levels of local government and the elites that control them through symbiotic relations
with organised crime (Aguirre and Herrera 2013; De Paz Mancera and Pérez Esparza 2018). Though the precise nature of the structure
of relations, collaboration and tolerance between local elites and criminal groups vary from place to place, these groups have penetrated
virtually every region of Mexico where organised crime is present. Generally speaking, the route of access that criminal groups use
to reach governmental institutions is through influencing elections, which have become mechanisms that allow them to gain legitimisation.
-
- It has been 10 years since Mexico’s government implemented its strategy to combat drug trafficking, but that campaign has produced
negative results. Drug consumption in the US continues apace (Christensen 2016) with no significant decrease in price, while the
number of deaths associated with criminal activity in Mexico has increased exponentially (Heinle, Molzhan and Shirk 2016) and the
country’s image has deteriorated, affecting other national investments (Rosen and Martínez 2015).
-
- Mexico’s national security strategies have predominantly depended on police-based approaches that have shrouded the political
roots of crime. Demand for drugs and illicit resources handled by trafficking cartels has flourished through periods of both political
instability and the recent phases of democratic consolidation. In fact, the expansion of activities of criminal groups has coincided
with the alternation of democratic power and periods during which solid, formal institutions existed to regulate social coexistence.
Despite the relation between institutional weakness and crime, the policies adopted by Mexico’s government have focused on
criminal groups using police and military tactics while ignoring the need to strengthen democratic institutions. This state of affairs
has developed mainly because the state government has refused to acknowledge the political aspects of violence; that is, the participation
of delinquent groups in political processes, especially elections. Criminal groups have found that elections are an effective instrument
for intervening in political affairs and occupying spaces of formal power.
- This study seeks to shed light on how local-level elections can be transformed into complex processes that involve and legitimise
criminal groups. It sets out to explain how elections in democratic systems that are still ‘under construction’, like
that of Mexico, can become mechanisms for legitimising and consolidating criminal presence in formal institutions of power. It is
in this sense that our work contributes to the existing literature on relations between elections and criminal dynamics (Acemoglu,
Robinson and Santos 2013; Alesina, Piccolo and Pinotti 2018; Solis and Aravena 2009).
-
- It is in this context that the present study analyses the relation between elections and organised crime in Mexico, specifically the
case of Michoacán, a state that clearly represents the political contradictions of the dynamics of organised criminal activity.
Here, the study focuses on municipal government elections. The state of Michoacán in western Mexico has long been characterised
by its preponderance of drug production and as a site where drug-trafficking cartels consolidate to export narcotics (Maldonado and
Aranda 2012). These processes are a result of collusion between local political groups and drug-traffickers through established accords,
whether explicit or implicit (Guerrero Gutiérrez 2014). The magnitude of these circumstances in Michoacán was such
that, in 2006, President Felipe Calderón (2006–2012) chose it as the place to launch his so-called ‘war on drugs’.
Michoacán also suffered from the absence of an adequate response to the deteriorating conditions of public security at all
levels of government (federal, state or municipal), a reality that propitiated the emergence of self-defence forces on the margins
of formal institutions.1
-
- The state of Michoacán has served as a laboratory for government experiments with combating drug trafficking. Widely known
as the ‘soul of Mexico’ (el alma de México), Michoacán is a microcosm of the broader problems of institutional
weakness and lack of legitimacy affecting the whole country. Throughout its history, this state has nurtured all of the grand political
transformations affecting Mexico: independence in the 19th century, the 1910 Mexican Revolution and advances towards democracy in
the late 20th century that paved the way for modern democratisation of the nation. Thus, a study of this state is a study of all
the problems that currently affect the country, for the political difficulties that beset Michoacán are similarly reproduced
in states like Sinaloa, Tamaulipas and Chihuahua, which also suffer intense violence related to organised crime groups.
-
- Since gaining independence, Mexico yet to consolidate as a nation of institutions that effectively regulate social coexistence. For
over 60 years of the 20th century, the country was governed at all levels by one ‘official’ political party, the Partido
Revolucionario Institutional (Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)). The PRI was led by the powerful figure of the President of
the Republic, who appointed all candidates for election to public office (Baez 2002; González 2009). This institutional arrangement
succeeded in establishing a system of control that provided a period of relative social tranquillity despite the existence of criminal
groups that trafficked in drugs, mainly marijuana.
-
- The PRI succeeded in bringing diverse social groups together under the corporative control of the president, in part by establishing
a sole channel for citizen participation. All social groups found a home—of sorts—in the PRI because it was made up of
three ‘sectors’: ‘popular’, ‘peasant’ and ‘worker’ sectors, although it had no overarching
ideology or proposal beyond the banner of ‘revolutionary nationalism’ (Aguilar Camín and Aguilar Rivera 2014).
Such an absence of any ideological commitment allowed the PRI to accommodate the ideologies and paradigms of succeeding presidents.
The arrangement did nothing to propitiate the emergence of an authentic democracy because it concentrated all opinions in one party
and one man—the president—but functioned very effectively as a mechanism of government and social control.
-
- As the nation’s most powerful figure who, through the PRI, controlled the only channel of political participation, the president
named state governors who, in turn, appointed local congresses and municipal governments (Carpizo 2004). In fact, the president sometimes
participated directly in designating mayors and state representatives, though the norm was to respect a hierarchy of power in which
the governors had the power to name local governments. While such an arrangement proved efficient in terms of control, it did not
give legitimacy to governors, much less to mayors and government representatives, all of whom were seen as products of the so-called
dedazo (i.e., direct appointment by the president) and not of authentic decisions by citizens.
-
- The year 2000 introduced an alternate form of power among political parties distinct from the PRI but also propitiated the breakdown
of existing systems of control and upset longstanding sociopolitical equilibriums (Mestries 2014). In practice, the absence of a
president capable of imposing political direction generated a situation in which state governors could act unchecked by effective
counterweights (Granados Roldán 2011; Grayson 2010) and were able to control elected representatives (diputados), prosecutors’
offices (fiscalías), the judiciary, the police, even the press. This process was accompanied by interventions on the part
of human rights organisations, commissions of transparency, universities and labour unions, all of which were largely controlled
by governors who enjoyed the prerogative of determining their state’s operating budget.
-
- In the case of Michoacán, the PRI governed uninterruptedly for over seven decades until 2002, after the Partido de la Revolution
Democrática (Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD)) triumphed in the 2001 elections (Herrera Torres and Colín Martínez
2016). From 2003 to 2015, five governors led the state: two consecutively from the PRD (2002–2008, 2008–2012) and three
from the PRI (2012–2015), although a ‘Public Security Commissioner’ was appointed by the federal government and
endowed with virtually the same powers as a governor. In reality, over the past 29 years, Michoacán has had 11 governors including
that currently in office (2015–2021). As Mexico’s constitution stipulates six-year periods in office, 11 governors would
normally correspond to 66 years of government (Estrada 2015).
-
- Such an extraordinary number of governors since 2002 reflects the institutional and democratic chaos in Michoacán. The discontinuity
in state government precluded the consolidation of long-term government projects and public policies which has, in turn, caused stagnation
in economic development and deterioration of wellbeing indicators in the state. As a result, informal employment has spread and environmental
degradation has worsened in the state over the past 20 years (Animal Político 2016; Chávez 2018; López 2016).
-
- Another important aspect about Michoacan’s political situation is the question of civil liberties. According to calculations
by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and others, from 2010 to 2015 the political rights and civil liberties of citizens in the state
suffered negatively by all assessments (Fundación Konrad et al. 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2015). Based on assessed indices,
Michoacán was among the lowest states in the nation. The rights and liberties established by Mexico’s institutions were
severely constrained by high levels of public insecurity and worsened by citizens’ non-compliance with the proposals of political
parties, which led to the use of methods for selecting candidates to governorships based on decisions imposed from federal level
of government. Internal elections in the political parties were held, but they further undermined the credibility of political parties
and widened the distance between the circles of power and the parties’ popular bases. The discretionary power that leaders
enjoyed in forging deals behind party members was enormous, with the resultant political infighting and machinations in Michoacán
further eroding the political rights of all citizens.
-
- In Michoacán, alternate leadership in the governor’s office, or at the level of municipal government, failed to bring
significant changes to people’s quality of life; rather, it has produced mostly negative results.
-
- Alcaldes (municipal presidents or mayors) are elected for a three-year period but can now be re-elected for one additional term. While
the position of mayor is an office of popular election, it is not subject to any real judicial oversight. In the context of Mexico’s
new federalism in the early 21st century, local governments secured larger budgets that made occupying the alcalde’s chair
quite attractive.
-
- Most municipalities in Michoacán are characterised by high levels of poverty and limited economic activity, so gaining the
position of mayor or occupying an office in local government is tempting from a cost-benefit perspective. Without doubt, participation
in local politics has become a lucrative business, since the ayuntamiento (i.e., municipal government) now administers its own public
resources, which are sourced from the state but can be complemented by federal funds. Finally, mayors receive a salary of around
USD 2,000 per month during their three years of service. For these reasons, the quest to secure a position in local government has
become, simply, an entrepreneurial activity. Local elections to choose mayors are controlled by the decisions of political parties,
not citizens, and supervised by electoral agencies that answer only to the interests of parties and lack the financial resources
necessary to effectively oversee the process and formalise the results (Perea Curiel 2017).
-
- It is essential to understand that municipal governments in Mexico enjoy a certain political and administrative autonomy within their
boundaries, including the power to impose taxes on property and grant permits, and control such public services as water, sewers,
public safety and basic infrastructure.
-
- Literature Review
-
- The literature on organised crime and politics stresses how delinquent groups tend to resort to violence to influence electoral processes
and the democratic life of nations (Kruijt 2012; Miklaucic and Naim 2013; Sullivan, 2013). Criminal groups attempt to wrest from
the state its monopoly on the use of force, especially in the context of weak governments and then pursue their own agendas for their
own benefit (Acemoglu, Robinson and Santos 2013; Alesina, Piccolo and Pinotti 2018; Solis and Aravena 2009). In general, organised
crime presents enormous challenges to formal institutions of nations where it exists and to the type of society that is envisioned
(Allum and Siebert 2003).
-
- According to Sung (2004), the initial stages of the processes of democratic construction, which include free elections and the recognition
of political rights, facilitate the infiltration of criminal groups into public life. Then, as these democratic processes become
more firmly established and strengthened, they create the conditions necessary for adequate management and counteraction of criminal
activity. This perspective fits well in explaining the case of Mexico, for the zenith of criminal activity in that country coincided
almost perfectly with the commencement of democratic processes in the year 2000. At the level of local government (municipio), the
case of Italy offers a critical illustration. According to Buonanno, Prarolo and Vanin’s analysis (2016) of electoral processes
in municipalities with a mafia presence, shows evidence that between 1994 and 2008, a specific political party (involved with mafia),
received higher vote shares in municipalities with mafia presence.
-
- Mexico exemplifies well a nation with an incipient democratic process characterised by gaps or lacunae in legitimacy—especially
at the level of local government—that has been filled by criminal groups (Aguirre and Herrera 2013). The intensity of electoral
competition and the weakness of institutions that exist to regulate the process generate an environment that allows vast amounts
of illegal money to influence political campaigns, especially at the level of local government.
-
- In Mexico, candidates who seek posts as mayors usually invest huge sums of money in their campaigns. According to Casar and Ugalde
(2018:74):
-
- The state institutions that oversee elections either turn a blind eye or are incapable of blocking the use of illegal funds in candidates’
campaigns (Espinosa Silis and Rojas Choza 2017; Marvan-Laborde 2014). Worse yet, the participation of state-level electoral agencies
that supervise local elections—broadly speaking—is controlled by party-based quotas, while administrative positions are
distributed among party members. Thus, local elections provide ample opportunities and incentives for criminal groups to intervene.
The opportunity to control local government and municipal police forces and to obtain a share of the municipal budget, are substantial
motivation. The vulnerability of local and state governments to infiltrations by organised crime groups is cause for doubting the
integrity of Mexico’s political and judicial systems (Aguirre and Herrera 2013).
-
- The links between mayors and delinquent groups have been thoroughly demonstrated elsewhere; they usually take one of three distinct
forms: 1) passive submission to extortion that is limited to paying quotas under threat; 2) active submission that consists of appointing
people with links to a cartel to key positions in state or municipal government; and 3) intentional complicity in which mayors protect
cartel members and participate in their illicit activities. These three distinct forms or linkages are by no means mutually exclusive.
In reality, they often operate complementarily with functionaries operating as go-betweens over time (Rivera Velázquez 2014).
-
- The institutional weakness of municipalities is also manifest in local governments’ inability to provide basic public services
to their citizens. Mexican municipalities depend primarily on funding by the state and federal governments, but these sources are
always insufficient to satisfy the enormous needs of the population. Local governments also lack professional administrative organs
and effective internal legal frameworks to fulfil their assigned functions. Moreover, public office positions are awarded to members
of political groups that support the sitting mayor, distributed not as a function of their abilities but according to their level
of political commitment or the role they played in the electoral campaign. Thus, those rewarded in this way include the most generous
contributors and individuals who have gained the mayor’s trust. In general terms, the deficiencies of Mexican democracy are
most clearly visible at the municipal level.
-
- Another problem is the large amount of money spent on political campaigns. The country’s journey towards democracy included
the adoption of measures designed to equalise the resources available to each political party, but this soon evolved into a system
of public funding of parties that resulted in Mexico becoming one of the most expensive democracies on the planet (Ugalde 2015).
Today, several parties have no real political identity and exist only to obtain a share of those public resources. In 2018, the cost
of elections in Mexico was equivalent to USD 1.55 billion (Luna 2018), an amount that is 46 times more than the total budget of the
federal government’s program for maternal, sexual and reproductive health! Despite these electoral processes, there has been
little progress with consolidating the political institutions that should act as effective counterweights to the president, governors
and mayors. The dispensation of justice in Mexico, meanwhile, is in the hands of prosecutors who are appointed by the president and
governors. Obviously, this direct dependence means that prosecutors lack autonomy and do not necessarily apply the law impartially
(Zapata Cruz 2017).
-
- The lack of capacity of municipal governments to provide adequate services to citizens, combined with the questionable processes of
designating people to mayorships, generated a serious lack of political legitimacy. Moreover, the enormous amounts of money invested
in campaigns and the—almost daily—cases of corruption involving municipal presidents revealed vacuums of authority at
this level of government (Rojas Rodríguez 2017).
-
- In reality, the electoral system stands out as one of the principal elements of processes of democratisation. Assessments of Mexico’s
governance system can be conducted by examining electoral competitiveness and citizen participation in elections (Sánchez
Ramos 2006).2 In the most recent local electoral process, the percentage of the distribution of votes and the margins of difference
between first and second place have shown a downward trend that reflects improvements in electoral competitiveness among parties
vying for mayorships. Municipalities have abandoned the format of one-party dominance and adopted a multi-party model. However, such
a multi-party model does not necessarily mean that democratisation has been achieved; it may be mere democratic veneer. The methods
of selecting candidates to occupy the office of the municipal president, for example, have been reduced to top-down designations,
although (sham) internal elections may be held and the distance between party leaders and their bases remains far. As we have emphasised
in this article, the other factor that qualifies the advances achieved in this minimalist democracy revolves around the participation
of drug cartels in electoral processes.3
-
- All of the above leads to illegitimate municipal governments. In the 2010–2014 period, criminal groups in many municipalities
of Michoacán in practice took on government functions and powers. The justice and order that these groups imposed often proved
to be more effective and expeditious than the legal mechanisms established by the country’s regulatory frameworks. Therefore,
it is no accident that the main criminal group that controlled Michoacán during 2010–2014 (the Caballeros Templarios
or Knights Templar) had both a written creed and a code of values that stressed respect for society and a commitment to protect citizens:
two functions that correspond to those of the mayor’s office.
-
- In addition to continuing their drug-trafficking activities (especially of synthetic substances), criminal groups in the state became
involved in resolving problems of land tenure, litigation between private parties, union disputes and defaulted debts; they also
imposed sanctions on common criminals. In fact, they took on many of the functions that were the responsibilities of local government.
The same institutional weakness propitiated the participation of other organised groups, such as labour unions in the educational
sector, in decision-making on public issues.
-
- Another facet of cartel involvement in the political life of municipalities is that it was very convenient for these criminals to
be able to count on local government support when they became the targets of military and police actions (Aguirre and Herrera 2013).
The federal government’s strategy to prevent the spread of organised crime emphasised the use of federal police and military
because municipal police were so often in cahoots with criminal groups (Aguiar-Aguilar and Azul 2014). We were surprised to discover
that such attacks by the central government on criminal groups could be seen as ‘intromissions’ into local public life
that violated municipal government autonomy.
-
- In some cases, municipal police served as sentinels for criminal groups by advising them of significant deployments of federal troops
and police in the zones where they were conducting delinquent activities (Jiménez 2018; Montero 2012; Proceso 2014). Indeed,
police operations planned by the federal government often failed because of the protection that local police provided to criminal
groups (Cervantes 2016; Topete 2018). Through their control of local governments, criminal organisations have sponsored protests
against the actions of the federal police and army, disguised as legitimate social demonstrations that denounced ‘invasions’
by the federal government and demanded that public security be addressed by municipal police. There is no doubt that in some municipalities,
these criminal groups were successful to a point in propagandising their creed and proposals by presenting themselves as protectors
of the people, integrity and property.
- Results
- Information from the interviews reflected the existence of a clear economic motivation for participating in political and public activities
among citizens, one that far surpassed an interest in carrying out a specific government program or pursuing a certain political
view. At the same time, it clearly revealed the enormous amounts of money handled during electoral processes. Most of our interviewees
had aspirations to develop activities in politics and/or business: ‘people here want to set up businesses, participate in agriculture,
or go into politics; that’s what’ll bring you the most money. Why toil away breaking your back if you can go into politics
and obtain loads of money.’
-
- Another finding was that participating in politics for purely personal enrichment was perceived as legitimate. No interviewee expressed
the view that aspiring to public office to fill one’s pockets constituted an illegal or immoral act. Indeed, they considered
it ‘normal’ for people to run for public office (mayor, council member [regidor] or administrative official) and saw
it as a legitimate way to obtain wealth:
- Thus, local elections were understood as an entrepreneurial activity that required investment in anticipation of future returns. Mayoral
candidates often had to sell their ranches or other properties, incur significant personal debt or take money from relatives in the
US to defray the costs of their campaigns, which generally included preparing print and electronic propaganda, travelling extensively
around the municipality, paying the food and travel expenses of people who participate in rallies and other campaign events and bribing
regional leaders with gifts or cash (Muñoz Aguilar 2016).
- Our interviewees added that on election day, candidates had to mobilise large groups of supporters to manipulate the process, by buying
votes for cash and/or paying political operators to transport crowds of voters to polling stations: ‘generally, a vote is worth
500 pesos [but] you have to get people to the voting booths [and] then take them back home. A good operator can bring as many as
100 voters to different stations on election day’. In this context, candidates are likely to be highly tempted to take the
money offered by criminal groups to support their campaign and to allow them to ‘operate’ for them on election day. Such
support may also include accepting the protection they offer and/or looking the other way as their thugs coerce political rivals.
-
- Interviewees further indicated that it was acceptable and ‘valid’ for candidates to obtain the approval (visto bueno)
of criminal groups:
- According to this interviewee:
- In exchange for having supported his/her campaign, criminals negotiate with the newly elected mayor for a share of the local budget—funds
usually destined for public works— and for control of the municipal police who, in theory, are entrusted with the task of ensuring
public security in the municipality. Their domination of municipal police forces mean that these forces become the first line of
defence against incursions by state or federal police: ‘By controlling the municipality, criminals ensure that the local police
won’t bother them’.
-
- However, it is important to emphasise the indifference that both state and federal governments have shown towards the critical situation
in municipal governments. The counterweights that should exist at those levels of government are simply absent. Some former mayors
expressed this situation as follows:
-
-
- In this regard, the state functionaries whom we interviewed emphasised the scarcity of resources and personnel available to address
the issue of security in Michoacán’s municipalities: ‘We lacked police and intelligence to attend to the situation
of the most violent municipalities; we didn’t have sufficient funds’. However, many local officials also identified a
tacit acceptance and even normalisation of violence in those municipalities: ‘There have always been problems of violence and
death in those regions of the state. We were never going to be able to fix that during the years we had left in government’.
-
- In Mexico, a state government has a six-year term with no possibility of re-election, so all public functionaries are removed from
office every six years, or every time there is a change in the secretary in charge of any particular sector, which is a very frequent
phenomenon.
-
- Another interesting finding is that municipal governments were viewed as lacking legitimacy:
-
-
- Our interviewees indicated that they mistrust municipal officials and their ‘supposed’ commitment to the citizenry. Interviewees’
main complaint is the lack of well-paid jobs and public services, which they relate specifically to public safety:
-
-
- It is also highly significant that interviewees expressed widespread disenchantment with democracy in Mexico:
- Our interviews further identified a symbiotic relationship between local political power and criminal groups, both of whom benefit
from this ‘partnership’. The criminals offer protection and gain enormous amounts of money, while the mayors can count
on formidable armed forces that allow them to exercise political power in the municipalities they govern. Through such unwritten
and informal agreements, commitments cement the local political classes and criminal groups. Based on our interviews, these political
commitments continue to bind when mayors accede to higher rungs on the political ladder; for example, as congress members (diputados)
in state congresses, or even in the federal congress: ‘Senator [name withheld] was in collusion with the Knights Templar, and
everybody here knew it, so nobody could understand how the federal government never realised who she was really representing’.
-
- Conclusions
-
- Cleary, there is an interaction between criminal activity and elections in Michoacán as delinquent groups seek the benefits
that can accrue from political participation. One of the most efficacious means of intervening in public life is through electoral
campaigns, especially at the municipal level. The exercise of political control over local governments protects organised crime groups
from actions by federal and state governments and the possibility of access to the financial resources that are assigned to municipalities.
-
- The lowest rung of the Mexican government is precisely the municipal council, which governs municipalities. As an institution, the
council should be the first to guarantee the forces of the state. However, the limited financial resources it administrates, its
lack of legitimacy and the inability of electoral agencies to regulate and control political campaigns, combine to impede their ability
to fulfil their functions. People have yet to see any tangible improvements in their daily lives since an alternate form of political
power began in the country in 2000. Thus, it is necessary to strengthen the institutional capacities and legitimacy of municipal
governments so that they can perform their assigned role as the community’s first line of defence against criminal groups.
-
- The case of Michoacán reveals that high levels of criminal activity result from political underdevelopment exacerbated by low
levels of human development, poor quality of education and low income levels. These are the very socio-economic characteristics of
a large percentage of the population in the state. As these conditions have coalesced to strengthen the presence of criminal groups,
the current situation cannot be attributed exclusively to the enormous demand for drugs in the US, though this demand was unquestionably
the spark that ignited a whole series of political and economic contradictions in Mexico.
-
- Finally, recent modifications in Mexico to the framework of electoral regulation allow the re-election of municipal governments for
two consecutive periods. This change was an attempt to establish more efficacious mechanisms of accountability and control the acts
of municipal presidents. However, given the existing context of institutional weakness, re-election would result in mayors serving
for six years, with no obligation to make any real improvements in public administration. For these reasons, it is urgent that greater
attention is focused on processes that will help consolidate Mexico’s democracy and on constructing effective institutions
to combat crime as part of the country’s anti-delinquency policies. Today, it is clear that military- and police-based measures
are severely limited in terms of their efficacy against organised crime in a setting where democratic and juridical institutions
are so weak.
- Correspondence: Jerjes Aguirre Ochoa, Senior Professor Universidad Michoacana de San Nicolas de Hidalgo (UMSNH) Brasilia 234, Americas
Norte. Morelia, Mexico. Email: jerjes_99@yahoo.com
- References
-
-
Local Elections and Organised Crime: The Case of Michoacán,
Mexico
Jerjes Aguirre Ochoa, Hugo Amador Herrera Torres
Universidad Michoacana de San Nicolas de Hidalgo, Mexico
This study, based on ethnographic analysis, reveals that municipal
government elections in Mexico have become spaces of struggle among
criminal
groups striving to strengthen their presence throughout the territory. In
municipal contexts characterised by institutional
vacuums, delinquent
organisations have succeeded in capturing political spaces. We argue that the
continuous violence that has plagued
the country since 2013 can be explained
largely by factors of an institutional order coupled with distorted electoral
processes in
municipalities and states, exacerbated by widespread citizen
disenchantment with democracy and especially manifest at the level of
local
government. This situation suggests the need for strategies that address the
influence of these criminal groups that go beyond
police-based approaches and
for actions designed to improve the quality of state institutions.
Keywords
Mexico; organised crime; municipal government; elections.
|
Please cite this article as:
Ochoa JA and Herrera Torres HA (2019) Local elections and organised
crime: The case of Michoacán, Mexico. International Journal for
Crime, Justice and Social Democracy Advance online publication. https://10.5204/ijcjsd.v8i4.1099
This
work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution
4.0 International Licence. As an open access journal, articles are free to
use with proper attribution. ISSN: 2202-8005
Introduction
One of
the principal characteristics of organised crime groups worldwide is their
relation to political power. In Mexico, as elsewhere,
delinquent groups
challenge the functioning of political institutions and battle to impose control
over territories. In the Mexican
context, organised crime has too easily
exploited the weakness of political institutions to penetrate government.
Explaining this
phenomenon requires adopting distinct perspectives that will
uncover the political-sociological aspects
involved.
The phenomenon of
criminality in Mexico must be examined from a perspective that emphasises the
relationship between political elites
and criminal groups. One difference
between the Mexican case and other regions around the world is that in numerous
municipalities
in Mexico, these relations have congealed around levels of local
government and the elites that control them through symbiotic relations
with
organised crime (Aguirre and Herrera 2013; De Paz Mancera and Pérez
Esparza 2018). Though the precise nature of the structure
of relations,
collaboration and tolerance between local elites and criminal groups vary from
place to place, these groups have penetrated
virtually every region of Mexico
where organised crime is present. Generally speaking, the route of access that
criminal groups use
to reach governmental institutions is through influencing
elections, which have become mechanisms that allow them to gain
legitimisation.
It has been
10 years since Mexico’s government implemented its strategy to combat drug
trafficking, but that campaign has produced
negative results. Drug consumption
in the US continues apace (Christensen 2016) with no significant decrease in
price, while the
number of deaths associated with criminal activity in Mexico
has increased exponentially (Heinle, Molzhan and Shirk 2016) and the
country’s image has deteriorated, affecting other national investments
(Rosen and Martínez
2015).
Mexico’s
national security strategies have predominantly depended on police-based
approaches that have shrouded the political
roots of crime. Demand for drugs and
illicit resources handled by trafficking cartels has flourished through periods
of both political
instability and the recent phases of democratic consolidation.
In fact, the expansion of activities of criminal groups has coincided
with the
alternation of democratic power and periods during which solid, formal
institutions existed to regulate social coexistence.
Despite the relation
between institutional weakness and crime, the policies adopted by Mexico’s
government have focused on
criminal groups using police and military tactics
while ignoring the need to strengthen democratic institutions. This state of
affairs
has developed mainly because the state government has refused to
acknowledge the political aspects of violence; that is, the participation
of
delinquent groups in political processes, especially elections. Criminal groups
have found that elections are an effective instrument
for intervening in
political affairs and occupying spaces of formal
power.
This study seeks to shed light on how
local-level elections can be transformed into complex processes that involve and
legitimise
criminal groups. It sets out to explain how elections in democratic
systems that are still ‘under construction’, like
that of Mexico,
can become mechanisms for legitimising and consolidating criminal presence in
formal institutions of power. It is
in this sense that our work contributes to
the existing literature on relations between elections and criminal dynamics
(Acemoglu,
Robinson and Santos 2013; Alesina, Piccolo and Pinotti 2018; Solis
and Aravena
2009).
It
is in this context that the present study analyses the relation between
elections and organised crime in Mexico, specifically the
case of
Michoacán, a state that clearly represents the political contradictions
of the dynamics of organised criminal activity.
Here, the study focuses on
municipal government elections. The state of Michoacán in western Mexico
has long been characterised
by its preponderance of drug production and as a
site where drug-trafficking cartels consolidate to export narcotics (Maldonado
and
Aranda 2012). These processes are a result of collusion between local
political groups and drug-traffickers through established accords,
whether
explicit or implicit (Guerrero Gutiérrez 2014). The magnitude of these
circumstances in Michoacán was such
that, in 2006, President Felipe
Calderón (2006–2012) chose it as the place to launch his so-called
‘war on drugs’.
Michoacán also suffered from the absence of
an adequate response to the deteriorating conditions of public security at all
levels of government (federal, state or municipal), a reality that propitiated
the emergence of self-defence forces on the margins
of formal
institutions.[1]
The
state of Michoacán has served as a laboratory for government experiments
with combating drug trafficking. Widely known
as the ‘soul of
Mexico’ (el alma de México), Michoacán is a microcosm
of the broader problems of institutional weakness and lack of legitimacy
affecting the whole country.
Throughout its history, this state has nurtured all
of the grand political transformations affecting Mexico: independence in the
19th century, the 1910 Mexican Revolution and advances towards democracy in the
late 20th century that paved the way for modern democratisation
of the nation.
Thus, a study of this state is a study of all the problems that currently affect
the country, for the political difficulties
that beset Michoacán are
similarly reproduced in states like Sinaloa, Tamaulipas and Chihuahua, which
also suffer intense
violence related to organised crime
groups.
Since gaining
independence, Mexico yet to consolidate as a nation of institutions that
effectively regulate social coexistence. For
over 60 years of the 20th century,
the country was governed at all levels by one ‘official’ political
party, the Partido Revolucionario Institutional (Institutional
Revolutionary Party (PRI)). The PRI was led by the powerful figure of the
President of the Republic, who appointed
all candidates for election to public
office (Baez 2002; González 2009). This institutional arrangement
succeeded in establishing
a system of control that provided a period of relative
social tranquillity despite the existence of criminal groups that trafficked
in
drugs, mainly marijuana.
The
PRI succeeded in bringing diverse social groups together under the corporative
control of the president, in part by establishing
a sole channel for citizen
participation. All social groups found a home—of sorts—in the PRI
because it was made up of
three ‘sectors’: ‘popular’,
‘peasant’ and ‘worker’ sectors, although it had no
overarching
ideology or proposal beyond the banner of ‘revolutionary
nationalism’ (Aguilar Camín and Aguilar Rivera 2014).
Such an
absence of any ideological commitment allowed the PRI to accommodate the
ideologies and paradigms of succeeding presidents.
The arrangement did nothing
to propitiate the emergence of an authentic democracy because it concentrated
all opinions in one party
and one man—the president—but functioned
very effectively as a mechanism of government and social
control.
As the
nation’s most powerful figure who, through the PRI, controlled the only
channel of political participation, the president
named state governors who, in
turn, appointed local congresses and municipal governments (Carpizo 2004). In
fact, the president sometimes
participated directly in designating mayors and
state representatives, though the norm was to respect a hierarchy of power in
which
the governors had the power to name local governments. While such an
arrangement proved efficient in terms of control, it did not
give legitimacy to
governors, much less to mayors and government representatives, all of whom were
seen as products of the so-called
dedazo (i.e., direct appointment by the
president) and not of authentic decisions by
citizens.
The year 2000
introduced an alternate form of power among political parties distinct from the
PRI but also propitiated the breakdown
of existing systems of control and upset
longstanding sociopolitical equilibriums (Mestries 2014). In practice, the
absence of a
president capable of imposing political direction generated a
situation in which state governors could act unchecked by effective
counterweights (Granados Roldán 2011; Grayson 2010) and were able to
control elected representatives (diputados), prosecutors’ offices
(fiscalías), the judiciary, the police, even the press. This
process was accompanied by interventions on the part of human rights
organisations,
commissions of transparency, universities and labour unions, all
of which were largely controlled by governors who enjoyed the prerogative
of
determining their state’s operating
budget.
In the case of
Michoacán, the PRI governed uninterruptedly for over seven decades until
2002, after the Partido de la Revolution Democrática (Party of the
Democratic Revolution (PRD)) triumphed in the 2001 elections (Herrera Torres and
Colín Martínez 2016).
From 2003 to 2015, five governors led the
state: two consecutively from the PRD (2002–2008, 2008–2012) and
three from
the PRI (2012–2015), although a ‘Public Security
Commissioner’ was appointed by the federal government and endowed
with
virtually the same powers as a governor. In reality, over the past 29 years,
Michoacán has had 11 governors including
that currently in office
(2015–2021). As Mexico’s constitution stipulates six-year periods in
office, 11 governors would
normally correspond to 66 years of government
(Estrada 2015).
Such an
extraordinary number of governors since 2002 reflects the institutional and
democratic chaos in Michoacán. The discontinuity
in state government
precluded the consolidation of long-term government projects and public policies
which has, in turn, caused stagnation
in economic development and deterioration
of wellbeing indicators in the state. As a result, informal employment has
spread and environmental
degradation has worsened in the state over the past 20
years (Animal Político 2016; Chávez 2018; López
2016).
Another important
aspect about Michoacan’s political situation is the question of civil
liberties. According to calculations
by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and
others, from 2010 to 2015 the political rights and civil liberties of citizens
in the state
suffered negatively by all assessments (Fundación Konrad et
al. 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2015). Based on assessed indices,
Michoacán
was among the lowest states in the nation. The rights and liberties established
by Mexico’s institutions were
severely constrained by high levels of
public insecurity and worsened by citizens’ non-compliance with the
proposals of political
parties, which led to the use of methods for selecting
candidates to governorships based on decisions imposed from federal level
of
government. Internal elections in the political parties were held, but they
further undermined the credibility of political parties
and widened the distance
between the circles of power and the parties’ popular bases. The
discretionary power that leaders
enjoyed in forging deals behind party members
was enormous, with the resultant political infighting and machinations in
Michoacán
further eroding the political rights of all
citizens.
In
Michoacán, alternate leadership in the governor’s office, or at the
level of municipal government, failed to bring
significant changes to
people’s quality of life; rather, it has produced mostly negative results.
Alcaldes (municipal
presidents or mayors) are elected for a three-year period but can now be
re-elected for one additional term. While the
position of mayor is an office of
popular election, it is not subject to any real judicial oversight. In the
context of Mexico’s
new federalism in the early 21st century, local
governments secured larger budgets that made occupying the alcalde’s
chair quite
attractive.
Most
municipalities in Michoacán are characterised by high levels of poverty
and limited economic activity, so gaining the
position of mayor or occupying an
office in local government is tempting from a cost-benefit perspective. Without
doubt, participation
in local politics has become a lucrative business, since
the ayuntamiento (i.e., municipal government) now administers its own
public resources, which are sourced from the state but can be complemented by
federal funds. Finally, mayors receive a salary of around USD 2,000 per
month during their three years of service. For these reasons,
the quest to
secure a position in local government has become, simply, an entrepreneurial
activity. Local elections to choose mayors
are controlled by the decisions of
political parties, not citizens, and supervised by electoral agencies that
answer only to the
interests of parties and lack the financial resources
necessary to effectively oversee the process and formalise the results (Perea
Curiel 2017).
It is essential
to understand that municipal governments in Mexico enjoy a certain political and
administrative autonomy within their
boundaries, including the power to impose
taxes on property and grant permits, and control such public services as water,
sewers,
public safety and basic
infrastructure.
Literature
Review
The literature on
organised crime and politics stresses how delinquent groups tend to resort to
violence to influence electoral processes
and the democratic life of nations
(Kruijt 2012; Miklaucic and Naim 2013; Sullivan, 2013). Criminal groups attempt
to wrest from
the state its monopoly on the use of force, especially in the
context of weak governments and then pursue their own agendas for their
own
benefit (Acemoglu, Robinson and Santos 2013; Alesina, Piccolo and Pinotti 2018;
Solis and Aravena 2009). In general, organised
crime presents enormous
challenges to formal institutions of nations where it exists and to the type of
society that is envisioned
(Allum and Siebert
2003).
According to Sung
(2004), the initial stages of the processes of democratic construction, which
include free elections and the recognition
of political rights, facilitate the
infiltration of criminal groups into public life. Then, as these democratic
processes become
more firmly established and strengthened, they create the
conditions necessary for adequate management and counteraction of criminal
activity. This perspective fits well in explaining the case of Mexico, for the
zenith of criminal activity in that country coincided
almost perfectly with the
commencement of democratic processes in the year 2000. At the level of local
government (municipio), the case of Italy offers a critical illustration.
According to Buonanno, Prarolo and Vanin’s analysis (2016) of electoral
processes in municipalities with a mafia presence, shows evidence that between
1994 and 2008, a specific political party (involved
with mafia), received higher
vote shares in municipalities with mafia
presence.
Mexico exemplifies
well a nation with an incipient democratic process characterised by gaps or
lacunae in legitimacy—especially
at the level of local
government—that has been filled by criminal groups (Aguirre and Herrera
2013). The intensity of electoral
competition and the weakness of institutions
that exist to regulate the process generate an environment that allows vast
amounts
of illegal money to influence political campaigns, especially at the
level of local government.
In
Mexico, candidates who seek posts as mayors usually invest huge sums of money in
their campaigns. According to Casar and Ugalde
(2018:74):
There are three illegal mechanisms for funding
campaigns: diverting public resources, illegal campaign contributions from the
private
sector, and money from organized crime. As with all investments, the
people who risk their money do so with the expectation of receiving
some kind of
future return. Governors or public servants participate to support their
party’s candidate or, sometimes, the
candidate of another party in order
to guarantee ‘immunity’ or construct networks of political support
that will help
them advance their own political aspirations. Entrepreneurs or
contractors cooperate in order to gain access to the new government
with a view
to winning contracts, receiving permits or establishing favorable regulations.
Finally, organized crime groups get involved
to protect their businesses by
gaining, for example, unimpeded access to transport routes and police
protection, or by infiltrating
government and seizing sales
places.
The state institutions that oversee elections either
turn a blind eye or are incapable of blocking the use of illegal funds in
candidates’
campaigns (Espinosa Silis and Rojas Choza 2017; Marvan-Laborde
2014). Worse yet, the participation of state-level electoral agencies
that
supervise local elections—broadly speaking—is controlled by
party-based quotas, while administrative positions are
distributed among party
members. Thus, local elections provide ample opportunities and incentives for
criminal groups to intervene.
The opportunity to control local government and
municipal police forces and to obtain a share of the municipal budget, are
substantial
motivation. The vulnerability of local and state governments to
infiltrations by organised crime groups is cause for doubting the
integrity of
Mexico’s political and judicial systems (Aguirre and Herrera
2013).
The links between
mayors and delinquent groups have been thoroughly demonstrated elsewhere; they
usually take one of three distinct
forms: 1) passive submission to extortion
that is limited to paying quotas under threat; 2) active submission that
consists of appointing
people with links to a cartel to key positions in state
or municipal government; and 3) intentional complicity in which mayors protect
cartel members and participate in their illicit activities. These three distinct
forms or linkages are by no means mutually exclusive.
In reality, they often
operate complementarily with functionaries operating as go-betweens over time
(Rivera Velázquez
2014).
The institutional
weakness of municipalities is also manifest in local governments’
inability to provide basic public services
to their citizens. Mexican
municipalities depend primarily on funding by the state and federal governments,
but these sources are
always insufficient to satisfy the enormous needs of the
population. Local governments also lack professional administrative organs
and
effective internal legal frameworks to fulfil their assigned functions.
Moreover, public office positions are awarded to members
of political groups
that support the sitting mayor, distributed not as a function of their abilities
but according to their level
of political commitment or the role they played in
the electoral campaign. Thus, those rewarded in this way include the most
generous
contributors and individuals who have gained the mayor’s trust.
In general terms, the deficiencies of Mexican democracy are
most clearly visible
at the municipal
level.
Another problem is the
large amount of money spent on political campaigns. The country’s journey
towards democracy included
the adoption of measures designed to equalise the
resources available to each political party, but this soon evolved into a system
of public funding of parties that resulted in Mexico becoming one of the most
expensive democracies on the planet (Ugalde 2015).
Today, several parties have
no real political identity and exist only to obtain a share of those public
resources. In 2018, the cost
of elections in Mexico was equivalent to
USD 1.55 billion (Luna 2018), an amount that is 46 times more than the
total budget of the
federal government’s program for maternal, sexual and
reproductive health! Despite these electoral processes, there has been
little
progress with consolidating the political institutions that should act as
effective counterweights to the president, governors
and mayors. The
dispensation of justice in Mexico, meanwhile, is in the hands of prosecutors who
are appointed by the president and
governors. Obviously, this direct dependence
means that prosecutors lack autonomy and do not necessarily apply the law
impartially
(Zapata Cruz
2017).
The lack of capacity
of municipal governments to provide adequate services to citizens, combined with
the questionable processes of
designating people to mayorships, generated a
serious lack of political legitimacy. Moreover, the enormous amounts of money
invested
in campaigns and the—almost daily—cases of corruption
involving municipal presidents revealed vacuums of authority at
this level of
government (Rojas Rodríguez
2017).
In reality, the
electoral system stands out as one of the principal elements of processes of
democratisation. Assessments of Mexico’s
governance system can be
conducted by examining electoral competitiveness and citizen participation in
elections (Sánchez
Ramos
2006).[2] In the most recent local
electoral process, the percentage of the distribution of votes and the margins
of difference between first
and second place have shown a downward trend that
reflects improvements in electoral competitiveness among parties vying for
mayorships.
Municipalities have abandoned the format of one-party dominance and
adopted a multi-party model. However, such a multi-party model
does not
necessarily mean that democratisation has been achieved; it may be mere
democratic veneer. The methods of selecting candidates
to occupy the office of
the municipal president, for example, have been reduced to top-down
designations, although (sham) internal
elections may be held and the distance
between party leaders and their bases remains far. As we have emphasised in this
article,
the other factor that qualifies the advances achieved in this
minimalist democracy revolves around the participation of drug cartels
in
electoral
processes.[3]
All
of the above leads to illegitimate municipal governments. In the 2010–2014
period, criminal groups in many municipalities
of Michoacán in practice
took on government functions and powers. The justice and order that these groups
imposed often proved
to be more effective and expeditious than the legal
mechanisms established by the country’s regulatory frameworks. Therefore,
it is no accident that the main criminal group that controlled Michoacán
during 2010–2014 (the Caballeros Templarios or Knights Templar) had
both a written creed and a code of values that stressed respect for society and
a commitment to protect citizens:
two functions that correspond to those of the
mayor’s office.
In
addition to continuing their drug-trafficking activities (especially of
synthetic substances), criminal groups in the state became
involved in resolving
problems of land tenure, litigation between private parties, union disputes and
defaulted debts; they also
imposed sanctions on common criminals. In fact, they
took on many of the functions that were the responsibilities of local
government.
The same institutional weakness propitiated the participation of
other organised groups, such as labour unions in the educational
sector, in
decision-making on public
issues.
Another facet of
cartel involvement in the political life of municipalities is that it was very
convenient for these criminals to
be able to count on local government support
when they became the targets of military and police actions (Aguirre and Herrera
2013).
The federal government’s strategy to prevent the spread of
organised crime emphasised the use of federal police and military
because
municipal police were so often in cahoots with criminal groups (Aguiar-Aguilar
and Azul 2014). We were surprised to discover
that such attacks by the central
government on criminal groups could be seen as ‘intromissions’ into
local public life
that violated municipal government
autonomy.
In some cases,
municipal police served as sentinels for criminal groups by advising them of
significant deployments of federal troops
and police in the zones where they
were conducting delinquent activities (Jiménez 2018; Montero 2012;
Proceso 2014). Indeed,
police operations planned by the federal government often
failed because of the protection that local police provided to criminal
groups
(Cervantes 2016; Topete 2018). Through their control of local governments,
criminal organisations have sponsored protests
against the actions of the
federal police and army, disguised as legitimate social demonstrations that
denounced ‘invasions’
by the federal government and demanded that
public security be addressed by municipal police. There is no doubt that in some
municipalities,
these criminal groups were successful to a point in
propagandising their creed and proposals by presenting themselves as protectors
of the people, integrity and property.
Methodology
In reality, no substantive methodological approach has yet been elaborated to
deal with topics related to organised crime in Mexico.
This field of study has
become ‘taboo’ due to the extreme danger that researchers are likely
to confront. A point of
comparison for the risks of academic research into these
topics can be found in the activity of investigative journalists. According
to
the organisation Artículo 19 (Article 19), Mexico is the second
most dangerous nation in the world for journalists and the most perilous country
in Latin America
(de la Luz 2018). Most journalists assassinated there were
involved in covering news on organised crime activity (Franco 2017)
This generalised atmosphere of insecurity has steered research mainly towards
quantitative studies carried out from the ‘confines
of secure
offices’ and based on official statistical data, which often fail to
provide precise details on the country’s
highly complex criminal processes
and their related subtle sociological and cultural factors. In this context,
qualitative approaches
can generate many particularities concerning criminal
phenomena. However, a subject matter of this nature requires researchers who
are
knowledgeable and deeply experienced in the field, precisely because of the
highly dangerous nature of the work.
With these considerations in mind, the present study was undertaken from an
ethnographic perspective, using interviews with key informants
who were
identified on the basis of the researchers’ considerable experience of
more than 10 years of fieldwork in the most
conflict-ridden zones of the state
of Michoacán. Our personal acquaintance over a period with many of the
actors in the state
facilitated the identification and consent of participants
to the interviews. We held 40 in-depth interviews with key political actors
at
the municipal level, municipal and state leaders of political parties, state and
federal representatives, members of local governments
and journalists in several
municipalities. All interviews took place in either the winter of 2017 or spring
of 2018. In all cases,
our objective was to document and then disentangle the
intricate relations that exist among processes of local elections, the
legitimacy
of local governments and criminal activities.
Though we framed our interviews as informal ‘chats’, we made
appointments with each proposed interviewee, informing them
that our topic of
interest was local-level development. The topic of the influence of criminal
groups on electoral processes was
never mentioned as the main reason for wishing
to speak with the selected individuals; however, as the interviews progressed we
sought
to broach issues of crime and delinquency that could have been affecting
the territories where they worked. In this way, we succeeded
in conducting a
free-flowing fluid exchange guided by a previously developed
‘script’ designed to gather information
while avoiding so-called
politically correct responses; doing so was important in light of the public
roles that many of our interviewees
have in society. The interviews lasted an
average duration of approximately one hour and took place either in a public
place or,
in some cases, in the interviewee’s home.
Most of the interviews (n = 34) were held in seven municipalities
with high levels of homicide linked to organised crime: Apatzingán,
Múgica, Uruapan, Peribán, Huetamo, San Lucas and
Tumbiscatío. During the interviews, the researchers took notes
and then
prepared a summary of the key aspects and phrases that were uttered immediately
after the interview.
Results
Information
from the interviews reflected the existence of a clear economic motivation for
participating in political and public activities
among citizens, one that far
surpassed an interest in carrying out a specific government program or pursuing
a certain political
view. At the same time, it clearly revealed the enormous
amounts of money handled during electoral processes. Most of our interviewees
had aspirations to develop activities in politics and/or business: ‘people
here want to set up businesses, participate in agriculture,
or go into politics;
that’s what’ll bring you the most money. Why toil away breaking your
back if you can go into politics
and obtain loads of
money.’
Another
finding was that participating in politics for purely personal enrichment was
perceived as legitimate. No interviewee expressed
the view that aspiring to
public office to fill one’s pockets constituted an illegal or immoral act.
Indeed, they considered
it ‘normal’ for people to run for public
office (mayor, council member [regidor] or administrative official) and
saw it as a legitimate way to obtain wealth:
one of the few things you can do is go into politics or become the mayor’s
friend, then you can do a little business with his
support. Those who work in
local government always come away with some kind of business or
money.
Thus, local elections were understood as an
entrepreneurial activity that required investment in anticipation of future
returns. Mayoral
candidates often had to sell their ranches or other properties,
incur significant personal debt or take money from relatives in the
US to defray
the costs of their campaigns, which generally included preparing print and
electronic propaganda, travelling extensively
around the municipality, paying
the food and travel expenses of people who participate in rallies and other
campaign events and bribing
regional leaders with gifts or cash (Muñoz
Aguilar 2016).
Our interviewees added that on election day, candidates
had to mobilise large groups of supporters to manipulate the process, by buying
votes for cash and/or paying political operators to transport crowds of voters
to polling stations: ‘generally, a vote is worth
500 pesos [but] you have
to get people to the voting booths [and] then take them back home. A good
operator can bring as many as
100 voters to different stations on election
day’. In this context, candidates are likely to be highly tempted
to take the money offered by criminal groups to support their campaign
and to
allow them to ‘operate’ for them on election day. Such support may
also include accepting the protection they
offer and/or looking the other way as
their thugs coerce political
rivals.
Interviewees
further indicated that it was acceptable and ‘valid’ for candidates
to obtain the approval (visto bueno) of criminal groups:
It’s necessary to have the support of [criminals] to make a career in
politics here; you need to [negotiate] with them so they’ll
leave you
alone to conduct your campaign ... if you don’t, you run the risk that
they’ll do something to you or to the
people in your campaign. This
isn’t so urgent now, since the Knights Templar went away, but it’s
still something you
need to take into account.
...
[Name withheld][4] had the support of
all the bad guys in the last election. The Knights Templar approached the
opposing [candidates] and threatened
to kill them if they didn’t stop
campaigning against him. They were afraid because they know [what those guys]
are like, so
they chose to back off. When [name withheld] took office, everybody
knew he was going to turn over control of the police and who
knows what else [to
them].
According to this interviewee:
Once mayors are in power, the bad guys call them to late-night meetings in some
abandoned place where they tend to leave them waiting
for hours until they
finally show up for brief encounters in the dark of night; just the mayors and
heavily armed criminal groups.
In exchange for having supported his/her campaign,
criminals negotiate with the newly elected mayor for a share of the local
budget—funds
usually destined for public works— and for control of
the municipal police who, in theory, are entrusted with the task of ensuring
public security in the municipality. Their domination of municipal police forces
mean that these forces become the first line of
defence against incursions by
state or federal police: ‘By controlling the municipality, criminals
ensure that the local police
won’t bother
them’.
However, it is
important to emphasise the indifference that both state and federal governments
have shown towards the critical situation
in municipal governments. The
counterweights that should exist at those levels of government are simply
absent. Some former mayors
expressed this situation as follows:
We couldn’t do anything. If we went and
complained to the state attorney, or even the governor himself, it was always
the same
[because] they too might have compromises and agreements with the bad
guys; so that made things even worse, because then they would
come after you
with even greater violence.
In this regard, the state
functionaries whom we interviewed emphasised the scarcity of resources and
personnel available to address
the issue of security in Michoacán’s
municipalities: ‘We lacked police and intelligence to attend to the
situation
of the most violent municipalities; we didn’t have sufficient
funds’. However, many local officials also identified a tacit
acceptance and even normalisation of violence in those municipalities:
‘There
have always been problems of violence and death in those regions of
the state. We were never going to be able to fix that during
the years we had
left in
government’.
In
Mexico, a state government has a six-year term with no possibility of
re-election, so all public functionaries are removed from
office every six
years, or every time there is a change in the secretary in charge of any
particular sector, which is a very frequent
phenomenon.
Another interesting
finding is that municipal governments were viewed as lacking legitimacy:
Everybody knows that mayors only take office to steal;
some carry out a few public works and attend to us in their office, but most
end
their terms with lots of money, ranches and lands, [while] the people end up as
screwed as ever.
Our interviewees indicated
that they mistrust municipal officials and their ‘supposed’
commitment to the citizenry. Interviewees’
main complaint is the lack of
well-paid jobs and public services, which they relate specifically to public
safety:
People live in fear they’re going to be assaulted
[and] that criminals will return and do more dirty work. Times aren’t
like
they used to be, when folk were poor but lived in peace. Now, [migrants] no
longer return from the United States because of
the bad reputation here due to
all the problems.
It is also highly
significant that interviewees expressed widespread disenchantment with democracy
in Mexico:
Being able to elect the president or representatives hasn’t served any
purpose at all. Candidates only come here on their campaigns,
but then forget
all about the people. Frankly, all we see is that they spend lots of money on
posters and announcements, but we never
see any improvements. We’re just
as poor and screwed as ever.
Our interviews further identified a symbiotic
relationship between local political power and criminal groups, both of whom
benefit
from this ‘partnership’. The criminals offer protection and
gain enormous amounts of money, while the mayors can count
on formidable armed
forces that allow them to exercise political power in the municipalities they
govern. Through such unwritten
and informal agreements, commitments cement the
local political classes and criminal groups. Based on our interviews, these
political
commitments continue to bind when mayors accede to higher rungs on the
political ladder; for example, as congress members (diputados) in state
congresses, or even in the federal congress: ‘Senator [name withheld] was
in collusion with the Knights Templar,
and everybody here knew it, so nobody
could understand how the federal government never realised who she was really
representing’.
Conclusions
Cleary,
there is an interaction between criminal activity and elections in
Michoacán as delinquent groups seek the benefits
that can accrue from
political participation. One of the most efficacious means of intervening in
public life is through electoral
campaigns, especially at the municipal level.
The exercise of political control over local governments protects organised
crime groups
from actions by federal and state governments and the possibility
of access to the financial resources that are assigned to
municipalities.
The lowest
rung of the Mexican government is precisely the municipal council, which governs
municipalities. As an institution, the
council should be the first to guarantee
the forces of the state. However, the limited financial resources it
administrates, its
lack of legitimacy and the inability of electoral agencies to
regulate and control political campaigns, combine to impede their ability
to
fulfil their functions. People have yet to see any tangible improvements in
their daily lives since an alternate form of political
power began in the
country in 2000. Thus, it is necessary to strengthen the institutional
capacities and legitimacy of municipal
governments so that they can perform
their assigned role as the community’s first line of defence against
criminal groups.
The case
of Michoacán reveals that high levels of criminal activity result from
political underdevelopment exacerbated by low
levels of human development, poor
quality of education and low income levels. These are the very socio-economic
characteristics of
a large percentage of the population in the state. As these
conditions have coalesced to strengthen the presence of criminal groups,
the
current situation cannot be attributed exclusively to the enormous demand for
drugs in the US, though this demand was unquestionably
the spark that ignited a
whole series of political and economic contradictions in
Mexico.
Finally, recent
modifications in Mexico to the framework of electoral regulation allow the
re-election of municipal governments for
two consecutive periods. This change
was an attempt to establish more efficacious mechanisms of accountability and
control the acts
of municipal presidents. However, given the existing context of
institutional weakness, re-election would result in mayors serving
for six
years, with no obligation to make any real improvements in public
administration. For these reasons, it is urgent that greater
attention is
focused on processes that will help consolidate Mexico’s democracy and on
constructing effective institutions
to combat crime as part of the
country’s anti-delinquency policies. Today, it is clear that military- and
police-based measures
are severely limited in terms of their efficacy against
organised crime in a setting where democratic and juridical institutions
are so
weak.
Correspondence: Jerjes Aguirre
Ochoa, Senior Professor Universidad Michoacana de San Nicolas de Hidalgo
(UMSNH) Brasilia 234, Americas Norte. Morelia,
Mexico. Email: jerjes_99@yahoo.com
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[1] The first case of self-defence
forces occurred in the municipality of Cherán in 2011 to combat illegal
forest exploitation,
presumably by, first, a drug cartel called La Familia
Michoacana, then by Los Caballeros Templarios. The people of
Cherán decided to take matters into their own hands and formed groups of
armed guards, installed checkpoints
to control access to the municipality and
refused to recognise the municipal government. Events culminated upon the
election of a
new local government with its own security apparatus through a
procedure based on ‘uses and customs’. In the same year,
self-defence groups appeared in the municipalities of Buenavista, Tepalcatepec,
Coalcomán, Chinicuila and Aquila to defend
people’s lives,
integrity and property (Rivera Velázquez 2013, 2014). Groups soon emerged
in other municipalities as
well. The Caballeros Templarios’ model
of extracting protection money was successful, but its very success pushed it to
its limits, for their demands soon exceeded
a threshold that people could
tolerate (Rivera Velázquez 2014).
[2] What is electoral
competitiveness? According to Sartori (1976), electoral competitiveness is
basically the conditions that formal
institutions establish for electoral
processes. Electoral competitiveness indicates the real situation of an
electoral process at
a specific moment. Thus, while a particular electoral
system may have rules designed to ensure fair competition, this does not
guarantee
that any specific electoral process will be competitive or fair (Del
Río 2017; Valdés 1995).
[3] From a maximalist perspective,
democracy refers to a specific context in which social agents enjoy
institutionalised political rights
and civil liberties
that–obviously–are accepted by those social agents themselves
(Cansino 1997; O’Donnell 1996).
In relation to political rights and civil
liberties during 2010 to 2015, Michoacán was evaluated as having
performed poorly
by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and others (2010–2015).
Indeed, in the years 2011, 2013 and 2015, this state was among the
lowest rated
in the nation, in part because the political rights and civil liberties
established by institutions were severely constrained
by problems of public
insecurity.
[4] The name is withheld for
security reasons.
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